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Editor’s Note:  These remarks were delivered by Justice Ginsburg
on September 27, 2007, at the annual educational conference of
the American Judges Association.  Because the conference took
place in Vancouver and was a joint conference with two Canadian
judicial organizations, she included some references to Canadian
sources.
Footnotes
1. William H. Rehnquist, Dedicatory Address: Act Well Your Part:
Therein All Honor Lies, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 227, 229-30 (1980).
2. The Constitution guarantees that federal judges “shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior . . . and shall . . . receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office.”  U.S. CONST. art III, § 1, cl. 2.
Proposals have been made to place term limits on U.S. Supreme
Court service.  See, e.g., R. CRAMTON & P. CARRINGTON, THE
SUPREME COURT RENEWAL ACT: A RETURN TO BASIC PRINCIPLES, IN
REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
467–471 (R. Cramton & P. Carrington eds. 2006) (proposing 18-
year limits on active service); Calabresi & Lindgren, Term Limits
for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 769 (2006).  But so far, discussion of such measures has
remained largely academic.  See, e.g., L. Greenhouse, New Focus
on the Effects of Life Tenure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, p. A20
(stating that the legislation proposed by Profs. Cramton and
Carrington “has not found a sponsor”).
3. See Constitution Act of 1867, §§ 99–100.
4. See Judiciary Reorganization Act, S. 1392, 75th Cong. § 1(a)
(1937), reprinted in Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary, S.
Rep. No. 75-711, p. 31 (1937).
Essential to the rule of law in any land is an independentjudiciary, judges not under the thumb of other branchesof Government, and therefore equipped to administer the
law impartially.  As experience in the United States and else-
where confirms, however, judicial independence is vulnerable
to assault; it can be shattered if the society law exists to serve
does not take care to assure its preservation.
On the essence of independent, impartial judging, a com-
ment by former U.S. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist seems
to me right on target.  Using a metaphor from his favorite
sport, he compared the role of a judge “to that of a referee in a
basketball game who is obliged to call a foul against a member
of the home team at a critical moment in the game: he will be
soundly booed, but he is nonetheless obliged to call it as he
saw it, not as the home crowd wants him to call it.”1
My remarks concentrate on judicial independence in the
system I know best, the Third Branch of the U.S. Govern-
ment—the federal courts—and on efforts by the political
branches to curtail that independence.  
I.
Under the U.S. Constitution, federal judges hold their
offices essentially for life, with no compulsory retirement age,
and their salaries may not be diminished by the legislature.2
(Canadian judges enjoy similar “security of tenure,” although
retirement at age 75 is mandatory.3) Through life tenure and
compensation that cannot be reduced, the founders of the
United States sought to advance the Judiciary’s independence
from Congress and the President, and thus to safeguard the
judges’ ability to decide cases impartially.  Yet I doubt that
constitutional insulation would have protected the federal
bench if we did not have a culture that frowns on attempts to
make the courts over to fit the President’s or the Congress’
image.  
A well-known illustration of that culture.  Some 70 years
ago, a proposal to pack the U.S. Supreme Court was
announced by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  The
Supreme Court of that day had resisted President Roosevelt’s
New Deal program.  In a 13-month span, the Court held
unconstitutional 16 pieces of federal social and economic
legislation.  
Frustrated by his inability to replace the “nine old men”
then seated on the Court, President Roosevelt sent to the
Senate a bill to overcome the Court’s recalcitrance.  He pro-
posed adding one justice for each member of the Court who
had served ten years, and did not retire in the six months fol-
lowing his seventieth birthday.4 FDR’s proposal would have
immediately swelled the Court’s size from nine to 15 members.
(If the 1937 plan were to be applied to the current Court, we
would today have a 13-member bench.)  Two developments,
manifest by the end of 1937, contributed to the defeat of
Roosevelt’s plan:  public opposition to the President’s endeavor
to capture the Court; and a growing understanding among the
justices that it was appropriate to defer to legislative judgments
on matters of social and economic policy.  FDR’s idea has never
been renewed.  Those who care about the health and welfare of
our system appreciate that packing the Court to suit the mood
of the political branches (Congress and the President) would
severely erode the status of the Judiciary as a coequal branch
of government.
II.
I turn now to some recent threats to the security of U.S.
judges who decide cases without regard to what the “home
crowd” wants.
A headline-producing case in point.  Early in 2005, federal
courts sitting in Florida confronted a cause célèbre.  On order
of the Florida state courts, a hospital had removed the feeding
tube from Terri Schiavo, a severely brain-damaged woman
whose situation sparked a huge controversy over the right to
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2005, at C1.
14. See S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005); H. Res. 97, 109th Cong.
(2005); Constitution Restoration Act, S. 520, H.R. 1070, § 201,
109th Cong. (2005); American Justice for Americans Citizen Act,
H.R. 1658, § 3 (2005).
15. Toward “Active Liberty,” HARV. L. BULL. 14, 18 (Spring 2006).
5. See Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo §5,
Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15, 16 (Mar. 21, 2005) (“Nothing in
this Act shall be construed to create substantive rights . . . .”).
6. Quoted in Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Even Death Does Not
Quiet Harsh Political Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at A1.   
7. Quoted in id.
8. Quoted in Editorial, Attacking a Free Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
2005, at A22.  
9. Editorial, Judges Made Them Do It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at
A22.
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refuse life support.  Congress entered the fray by passing a
most unusual statute giving the federal courts jurisdiction to
hear the plea of Terry Schiavo’s parents, but not altering the
governing substantive law.5 The federal courts read the
statute as it was written, and refused to override the Florida
courts by ordering restoration of the feeding tube.  This was
not the outcome wanted by a goodly number of the members
of Congress.  In angry reaction, the then House Majority
Leader accused federal judges of “thumb[ing] their nose[s] at
Congress and the [P]resident.”6 He warned: “[T]he time will
come for the men responsible for this to answer for their
behavior.”7 “Congress,” he amplified, “for many years has
shirked its responsibility to hold the judiciary accountable.
No longer.”8
Similarly unsettling, in the same year, 2005, two episodes of
violence against judges shocked the nation.  A state court judge
was murdered while on the bench in Atlanta and a federal
judge’s mother and husband were murdered at the judge’s home
in Chicago.9 Shortly thereafter, a prominent Senator gave a
widely reported speech on the Senate floor.  After inveighing
against “activist jurists,” he suggested there may be “a cause-
and-effect connection” between judicial activism and the “recent
episodes of courthouse violence in this country.”10
The blasts from Congress were not merely verbal.  In May
2005, the House Judiciary Committee considered creating an
“office of inspector general for the federal judiciary.”11 The
office would investigate allegations of judicial misconduct and
report them to Congress.  The Committee’s chairman said, in
announcing the proposal, that judges must “be punished in
some capacity for behavior that does not rise to the level of
impeachable conduct.”12 If the then chairman’s subsequent
action indicated the role he envisioned for the proposed
inspector general, judges had good cause for concern.  In June
2005, that chairman’s office dispatched a letter to a U.S. Court
of Appeals, complaining that the court had affirmed an unlaw-
fully low sentence for a narcotics-case defendant.  The letter
called for a “prompt response . . . to rectify” the decision,13
even though the government sought no further review of the
sentence.
Another troubling congressional initiative:  proposals to
prohibit federal courts from relying on foreign law.14 A mis-
understanding appears to underlie the opposition to foreign
law citations.  As Justice Stephen Breyer explained in a recent
interview, citations to foreign laws and decisions should not be
controversial.15 “References to cases elsewhere are never bind-
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ing,” Justice Breyer emphasized.  We interpret and apply only
our own Constitution, our own laws.  But it can add to our
store of knowledge “to look at how other people [with a com-
mitment to democracy similar to our own] solve similar prob-
lems.”  (In this regard, I have found enlightening decisions of
Canada’s Supreme Court.)  Justice Breyer compared references
to the decisions of foreign and international tribunals to refer-
ences to a treatise or to a professor’s work.  
Lest I appear to be spreading too much gloom, I should
emphasize the vocal defenders of the Judiciary, intelligent
voices that do not divide along party lines.  The New York
Times, a paper some regard as “liberal,” recently editorialized:
“The courts will not always be popular; they will not always be
right.  But if Congress succeeds in curtailing the judiciary’s
16. Editorial, supra, note 8.
17. Theodore B. Olson, Lay Off Our Judiciary, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21,
2005, at A16.
18. Federal Judicial Center, Impeachments of Federal Judges,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/topics_ji_bdy (last vis-
ited Aug. 28, 2007).
19. Maria Simon, Note, Bribery and Other Not So “Good Behavior”:
Criminal Prosecution as a Supplement to Impeachment of Federal
Judges, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1617 n.2 (1994).
20. Streamlined Procedures Act, U.S. 1088, H.R. 3035, 109th Cong.
(2005).
21. Safeguarding our Religious Liberties Act, H.R. 4576, § 2, 109th
Cong. (2005). 
22. We the People Act, H.R. 4379, § 3, 109th Cong. (2005). 
23. Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act of 2005,
H.R. 3073, § 2, 109th Cong. (2005). 
24. Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 33(1).
ability to act as a check on the other two branches, the nation
will be far less free.”16 Former Solicitor General Ted Olson,
generally perceived as conservative, published a similar view:
“Americans understand,” and I hope he is right, “that no sys-
tem is perfect and no judge immune from error, but also that
our society would crumble if we did not respect the judicial
process and the judges who make it work.”17
History suggests that Congress is unlikely to employ the
nuclear weapon—impeachment—against judges who decide
cases in a way the “home crowd” does not want.  In the 219
years since the ratification of the Constitution, the House of
Representatives has impeached only 13 federal judges; in only
seven instances did impeachment result in a Senate convic-
tion,18 and those judges were removed not for wrongly inter-
preting the law, but for unquestionably illegal behavior, such as
extortion, perjury, and waging war against the United States.19
Although politically driven impeachment of federal judges
is a remote prospect, yet another threat to judicial indepen-
dence cannot be discounted so easily.  In President Clinton’s
second term, it bears reminding, political hazing of federal
judicial nominees was unrelenting.  The confirmation process
in those years often strayed from examining the qualifications
of each nominee into an endeavor to uncover some hidden
“liberal” agenda the nominee supposedly harbored.  For many
Democrats, President Bush’s successive terms have been pay-
back time, an opportunity to hold up or reject Bush nominees
to the federal judiciary on ideological grounds.
Injecting politics prominently into the nomination or the
confirmation process means long delays in filling judicial
vacancies, and delay, in the face of mounting caseloads, threat-
ens to erode the quality of justice the U.S. federal judiciary
can provide.  Vacancies in large numbers inevitably sap the
energy and depress the spirits of the judges left to handle
heavy dockets.
I should mention, too, the host of jurisdiction-curtailing
measures lately placed in the congressional hopper.  One bill
would have severely limited the scope of federal habeas corpus
review.20 Another would have removed federal courts’ author-
ity to decide any case concerning the Ten Commandments, the
Pledge of Allegiance, and the National Motto, “In God We
Trust.”21 Yet another would have taken away from the federal
courts authority to adjudicate free exercise or establishment of
religion claims, privacy claims (including those raising “any
issue of sexual practices, orientation, or reproduction”), and
any claim to equal protection of the laws “based upon the right
to marry without regard to sex or sexual orientation.”22
All these proposals, and other like-minded bills, failed, as
students of history could have predicted.  Jurisdiction-strip-
ping reactions to disliked decisions have been proposed peren-
nially.  In the 1950s, desegregation and domestic-security cases
were on some legislators’ strip lists; in the 1960s, federal court
review of certain criminal justice matters; in the 1970s, busing
to achieve racial integration in schools; in the 1980s, abortion
and school prayer.  None of these efforts succeeded, and most
of the more recent endeavors to curb federal court jurisdiction
have fared no better.  A simple truth has helped to spare the
Federal Judiciary from onslaughts of this character: It is easier
to block a bill than to get it enacted.    
I note, finally, a Congress-Court confrontation proposed in
2004 and revived the next year.  The most recent try, titled the
“Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act of
2005,” would allow U.S. Supreme Court judgments declaring
a federal law unconstitutional to be overturned by a two-thirds
vote of the House and Senate.23 (Canada’s Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, if I recall the “notwithstanding clause” cor-
rectly,24 allows for a legislative override of a Supreme Court
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decision holding a statute incompatible with a Charter-pro-
tected right.  But the Parliament, is it not so, has yet to avail
itself of that prerogative.)
A Constitution providing for legislative override of court
decisions resolving constitutional questions, author and jour-
nalist Anthony Lewis observed, “would be more democratic in
the sense that it would remove constraints on majority rule.”25
But, Lewis rightly reminds us, in the words of Aharon Barak,
former president of the Supreme Court of Israel:  “‘Democracy
is not only majority rule.  Democracy is also the rule of basic
values . . . values upon which the whole democratic structure
is built, and which even the majority cannot touch.’”26 The
founders of the United States did not envision a rule of law
based on pure majoritarianism,27 and I see no cause to open
the door to a legislative override now.
Particularly since the 2006 election, I am pleased to relate,
rapport between Congress and the federal courts has markedly
improved.  No bills of the kind I have described have been
introduced in the current Congress, and one sees far fewer
broadsides against “activist judges” reported in the press.
A note on U.S. state courts, whose judges in most states, at
least at some levels, are chosen in periodic elections.  A ques-
tion I am often asked when traveling abroad: “Isn’t an elected
judiciary totally at odds with judicial independence?”  How
can an elected judge resist doing “what the home crowd
wants”?  I have no fully satisfactory answers to those ques-
tions. 
To return to my starting line, when former Chief Justice
Rehnquist described an independent judiciary as the USA’s
hallmark and pride, he was repeating a theme sounded since
the United States became a nation.  James Madison was per-
haps most eloquent on the subject.  When he introduced in
Congress the amendments that became the Bill of Rights, he
said:
[I]ndependent tribunals of justice will consider
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of th[e]se
rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against
every assumption of power in the Legislative or
Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the
Constitution by the declaration of rights.28
Madison may have put the matter with more force than his-
tory confirms, but his basic idea remains vibrant.  
It is fitting, I think, to close with the words of two U.S. legal
scholars from different ends of the political spectrum—one,
Bruce Fein, known for his “conservative perspective,” the
other, Burt Neuborne, known for his “progressive vision.”
Though often on opposite sides in debate, they joined together
to speak with one voice on the value of judicial independence.
Their co-authored essay concludes: 
Judicial independence in the United States strength-
ens ordered liberty, domestic tranquility, the rule of law,
and democratic ideals. . . .  It would be folly to squan-
der this priceless constitutional gift to placate the clam-
ors of benighted political partisans.29
To that, I would add only “Amen.”
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